Contracts Category Archives — Page 7 of 8 — The Virginia Business Litigation Blog Published by Virginia and Washington, D.C. Litigation & Appeals Attorney

April 11, 2011

Judge Alper Grants Limited Discovery to Lacoste in Counterfeiting Case

Lacoste Alligator, S.A., which sells tennis shirts and other apparel with the distinctive green crocodile logo in high-end stores like Nordstrom and Saks Fifth Avenue, will get a chance to find out, through discovery in a lawsuit, which of its distributors (if any) have been selling its products to Costco and other warehouse stores without its express permission, in violation of its trademark rights and in breach of contract.

Lacoste, a Swiss company, is attempting to prevent its clothing from being sold in big-box and other unauthorized retail locations. The first problem facing Lacoste, however, was that although it believed that some distributor was making sales to those stores, it didn’t know who it was. Accordingly, it filed a “John Doe” complaint in Arlington County Circuit Court on trademark-infringement, breach of contract, and other grounds, hoping to use discovery in the case to ferret out the identity of the distributor responsible for the unauthorized sales. After filing the “John Doe” suit, Lacoste promptly served a subpoena on Costco Wholesale Corp., trying to ascertain the source from which it was receiving Lacoste products for resale in its stores. Costco objected to handing over any documents, and Lacoste filed a motion to compel compliance with the subpoena.

Judge Joanne F. Alper overruled most of Costco’s objections and held that Lacoste was entitled to the discovery subject to the entry of an appropriate protective order to prevent misuse of the information.

March 16, 2011

Summary Judgment Granted in Breach of Contract Action

by Lee E. Berlik

A U.S. district judge in Virginia has ruled that a restaurant chain operator is liable for breach of contract and is obligated to pay a franchise consulting company for sales and marketing services that the consultant performed for the chain under the contract between the two companies. Rejecting the contract defenses of lack of standing, fraudulent inducement, lack of specificity, lack of mutuality, and unconscionability, U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis, III, of the Eastern District of Virginia, granted summary judgment in favor of the consultant.

The case arose from a 2008 contract between Freshii Development, LLC, which owns a chain of healthy fast-food restaurants, and Fransmart, LLC, an Alexandria, Va.-based company that agreed, in exchange for a percentage of franchise fees and revenues, to help Freshii expand by finding appropriate franchisees for its restaurants. In early 2010, Fransmart restructured its business and set up a new company to which it assigned its contracts and transferred its assets and liabilities. Freshii then stopped paying Fransmart under the contract, and Fransmart sued for breach. Freshii asserted five defenses to the lawsuit, all of which Judge Ellis rejected.

Freshii first argued that Fransmart lacked standing because the 2008 agreement was a personal services contract and therefore not assignable to a separate entity (such as the “new Fransmart”) without Freshii’s consent. Judge Ellis rejected this defense, noting that many aspects of the agreement led to the conclusion that it was not a personal services contract. For example, the agreement was between two corporate entities, it was for a duration of ten years, and it did not identify any individual as being material to performance. In any event, the judge wrote, it was not necessary to reach that issue because the contract contained a “successors and assigns” clause, stating that “the provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and to their successors and assigns.” This language, the court found, demonstrated that the parties intended the agreement to be assignable to a successor entity like the new Fransmart.

March 7, 2011

How IronClad Is Your Non-Compete Agreement?

by Lee E. Berlik

In Virginia, employers who wish to restrict their employees from competing with them in a new job need to write restrictive covenants tightly and narrowly and should define all the key terms in their noncompete and nonsolicitation agreements carefully – or the courts will not enforce the covenants and former employees will be free to disregard the restrictions. That’s one of the messages of a ruling handed down recently by Judge Frederick B. Lowe of the Virginia Beach Circuit Court in a case involving a nurse practitioner who left a medical group to set up her own competing practice.

Ameanthea Blanco was a family nurse practitioner employed by Patient First Richmond Medical Group, LLC, which provided primary and urgent care to patients. She signed an employment agreement in January 2010 that contained non-competition and non-solicitation provisions. In August 2010, she resigned from Patient First, and a little over a month later, she opened her own practice nearby. Patient First sued Blanco for an injunction to enforce the non-competition and non-solicitation provisions, but the circuit judge declined to issue an injunction, finding the relevant portions of the agreement to be unenforceable.

The noncompete agreement barred Blanco, for two years after she left the company, from performing medical services of the type that she performed at Patient First in the previous 12 months, anywhere within a seven-mile radius of any Patient First center at which she “regularly provided medical services.” She was restricted from doing so as an “agent, officer, director, member, partner, shareholder, independent contractor, owner or employee,” and the prohibition applied if she did so “directly or indirectly.”

December 30, 2010

Virginia Consumer Protection Act Enforced Against Roofer

by Lee E. Berlik

Lawyers representing Ryerson, Inc., a metal roofing company, were called upon recently to defend the company against the claims of two homeowners who alleged that Ryerson failed to honor the warranty on its roofing system and that such failure violated the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (“VCPA”). The lawyers argued that Ryerson could not be liable under the VCPA because all statements made in its warranty were statements of opinion rather than factual misrepresentations. The Eastern District of Virginia disagreed.

The VCPA was enacted to promote fair and ethical standards of dealings between suppliers and the consuming public. (See Va. Code § 59.1-197). It contains provisions that make it unlawful for a supplier to misrepresent that goods and services are of “a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model,” and prohibits suppliers from using “any other deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or misrepresentation in connection with a consumer transaction.” (See Va. Code § 59.1-200(A)(6), (14)).

In Gottlieb v. Ryerson, the Gottliebs (according to the Complaint) hired a contractor to install a Ryerson steel roof on their gazebo and house. The roof came with a 20-year warranty, which assured the Gottliebs that the warranty was “low-risk, no-nonsense, [and] ironclad.” The warranty materials also stated that Ryerson would honor the warranty “at any time and as often as needed within the 20-year period” from the installation date, and that the warranty entitled the homeowners to “complete repair or replacements of any covered problem–freight and labor included.”

August 31, 2010

Noncompete Agreements: Getting Them to Stick

by Lee E. Berlik

Non-competition and non-solicitation clauses found in employment agreements often do not provide employers with the protection the employers assume they are getting. Virginia courts will refuse to enforce such “noncompetes” if they are written in vague terms or if they are broader than necessary to meet the employer’s legitimate business interests. As restraints on trade, restrictive covenants are disfavored by the courts. Consequently, any ambiguities in the contract will be construed in the employee’s favor. Fairfax Circuit Court Judge Michael F. Devine recently illustrated these principles in Daston Corp. v. MiCore Solutions, Inc., in which he upheld a nonsolicitation clause but struck down a noncompete agreement as unenforceable.

The case was brought by Daston Corporation, an information technology company that provides, among other things, a range of services based on Google Apps software, against two former employees who went to work for MiCore Solutions, a business offering similar services. Both employees had signed identical employment agreements with Daston containing both a noncompete clause and a nonsolicitation clause. The employees sought to dismiss Daston’s claims, arguing that the employment agreement’s restrictions were unenforceable. Judge Devine agreed in part and disagreed in part.

The court began its analysis by noting that, in Virginia, non-competition agreements will be enforced only “if the contract is narrowly drawn to protect the employer’s legitimate business interest, is not unduly burdensome on the employee’s ability to earn a living, and is not against public policy.”

June 4, 2010

Pay-When-Paid Clauses Enforceable in Virginia

by Lee E. Berlik

Virginia, unlike some other states, adheres to a policy favoring freedom to contract. Virginia law treats most businesses and individuals as presumptively capable of negotiating in their own best interests, and when a deal is reached and a contract is signed, courts rarely interfere with the result, however unfair that result may seem to outside parties.

In construction contracts, for example, it is common to find a “pay when paid” clause, stating that a subcontractor’s right to any payments from the general contractor is expressly conditioned on the general contractor’s first receiving payment from the owner. Some states go out of their way to protect subcontractors from the potential harsh consequences such a provision can cause. Virginia courts, however, will assume that the subcontractor was sophisticated enough to know what it was signing and will enforce contracts as written.

The freedom to contract includes the freedom to negotiate pay-when-paid clauses, and Virginia courts will enforce such clauses provided they are clear and unambiguous. In Universal Concrete Products v. Turner Construction, Universal, a subcontractor, entered into a written agreement with Turner, the general contractor, to install pre-cast concrete on the Granby Tower project in Norfolk, Virginia. When the real estate market collapsed, the owner became unable to finance the construction. Universal, however, substantially completed all of its work on the project, and naturally asked Turner to pay for its services. Turner refused to pay Universal because Turner had not been paid by the owner and the parties’ subcontract contained a pay-when-paid clause.

February 15, 2010

UCC Protects Bank from Breach of Contract Allegations

by Lee E. Berlik

Even in Virginia, which recently placed first in a ranking of the “Best States for Business” by Forbes.com, businesses often fail. Particularly in small companies, relationships among the owners sour and partnership disputes arise. Here in Fairfax County, where my practice is located, it is not uncommon for disgruntled partners to attempt to withdraw large sums from corporate bank accounts prior to dissolution or to attempt to block other owners’ access to the company’s accounts. Banks need to be careful not to get caught in the crossfire by inadvertently facilitating a wrongful cash grab by one of the business owners. Fortunately, as illustrated by a recent decision by Fairfax Judge Bellows, Virginia’s adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code provides some valuable protection to banks.

Khan v. Alliance Bank (Fairfax Circuit Court, Dec. 22, 2009) involved a dispute between two owners of Advantage Title and Escrow, LLC, Khan and Kazmi. Both were authorized signatories on the company’s account held with Alliance Bank. After the two had a falling out, Kazmi instructed the bank to remove Khan as a signatory. A few days later, Khan wrote a $35,000 check against Advantage Title’s account in exchange for a cashier’s check for that amount. Upon learning of the transaction, Kazmi sent an “Affidavit of Unauthorized Transaction” to Alliance Bank. This document alleged, under oath, that Khan obtained the cashier’s check through fraud as Khan was (according to Kazmi) not authorized to withdraw funds from the company’s account. In reliance on that affidavit, Alliance Bank canceled the cashier’s check and credited $35,000 back to the Advantage account.

Normally, putting a stop-payment order on a check is not a big deal. But cashier’s checks, which are governed by the UCC, are different. Unlike personal checks, cashier’s checks carry a promise of the bank to the holder. For that reason Khan sued Alliance Bank, claiming that the promise was unconditional and that, by terminating payment, Alliance was liable to Khan for breach of contract and conversion.

February 1, 2010

BMW Survives Tortious Interference Case

by Lee E. Berlik

Business litigation often involves allegations that a competitor engaged in unfair competition or business tactics designed to injure the plaintiff’s business. Such cases will only be successful, however, if the defendant business has crossed the line between legitimate competitive activity and tortious conduct. In a new Fourth Circuit opinion written by Judge Mark S. Davis of the Eastern District of Virginia, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of BMW, explaining that not all aggressive competition will be deemed unfair or unlawful; a competitor pursuing its legitimate business interests will often be permitted to do so without incurring liability.

BCD, LLC v. BMW Mfg. Co. involved a dispute over a project to build a new school of engineering on the Clemson University campus. The plaintiff, Rosen (and the companies controlled by him) and BMW were each involved in different aspects of the construction project. Rosen had entered into a tentative agreement with Clemson in 2002, which outlined the responsibilities each would each have in the construction of a wind tunnel. The agreement was not binding, however, because there remained certain unresolved details, and the written agreement specifically allowed either party to withdraw from the project if they could not agree as to those unresolved details. The agreement was thus in the nature of an “agreement to agree” rather than a final, binding contract.

Clemson and BMW, on the other hand, had entered into a final agreement to which each party was bound, and BMW had received a $25 million grant from the state for the project. As preparation for the construction of the school was getting underway, Rosen declared that he wanted the new school to be built on land he owned, but BMW objected because it wanted to keep the state-funded school separate from the privately-funded wind tunnel.jpg wind tunnel. As time wore on, little to no progress was made on the construction of the wind tunnel, and Clemson and Rosen were still unable to come to an agreement on the unresolved details from the 2002 agreement. Finally, Rosen and Clemson signed a new agreement in 2003 that negated the 2002 agreement, resolved all of the details, and included a sale of Rosen’s land to Clemson so the school could be built on land that was now publicly-owned. Rosen did not want to cede control over the property, and felt that BMW coerced Clemson into stalling on the wind tunnel project so BMW could exert control over Rosen’s property. He thus sued BMW for tortious interference with a contract, intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, and civil conspiracy.

January 4, 2010

Virginia Government Contractor Accused of Business Conspiracy

by Lee E. Berlik

Conducting business in Virginia can be a cutthroat affair. Our capitalist system demands that firms compete with each other in price, quality, and technology, and the most innovative company will often win the largest number of lucrative government contracts. Unfortunately, some contractors utilize unfair, unethical, or illegal methods in the name of competition. Virginia is one of several states that have enacted “business conspiracy” statutes designed to discourage and punish some of these practices. The statute is very popular with Virginia lawyers, due in no small part to its provisions allowing recovery of both treble damages and attorneys fees.

In Turbomin AB v. Base-X, Inc., a case pending in the federal court sitting in Lynchburg, the plaintiff (Turbomin) had a contract to perform services for Base-X, a government contractor located near Lexington. In winning this contract, Turbomin beat out another defendant in the case, Lindstrand Technologies Ltd. Eventually, however, Base-X terminated its contract with Turbomin and refused to pay the balance allegedly owed to Turbomin. Turbomin’s officers suspected that disgruntled Lindstrand employees convinced Base-X employees to breach the contract. Invoking Virginia’s business conspiracy statute, Turbomin alleges that Base-X and Lindstrand “conspired to interfere with a business reputation”.

Judge Norman Moon, in granting the plaintiff’s motion to add a business conspiracy count to its complaint, clarified the requirements of this Virginia law. In order to win this type of conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must prove three things: that the defendants (1) engaged in a concerted action, (2) with legal malice, (3) resulting in damages. Judge Moon explained that a “concerted action” is any association or agreement among the defendants to engage in the conduct that caused the plaintiff injury. Legal malice, the court held, requires showing “that the defendant acted intentionally, purposefully, and without lawful justification” to injure the plaintiff. Judge Moon also observed that while a plaintiff need not prove that the defendant’s “primary and overriding purpose” in forming the conspiracy was to injure the plaintiff’s reputation, trade, or business, such must be at least one of the purposes of the conspiracy.

December 7, 2009

Contract or Tort? Look to the Origin of the Duty.

by Lee E. Berlik

Trial lawyers drafting lawsuits on behalf of their clients generally try to plead as many causes of action as possible. In particular, they often try to add “tort” claims to a case that is really just about a breach of contract. Virginia law generally does not permit recovery on tort claims when the duty that is breached is based on a contractual relationship. What’s the difference? For one thing, when it comes to assessing damages, the law of contracts looks to those that were within the contemplation of the parties when framing their agreement. Contract remedies are designed to compensate parties for foreseeable losses suffered as a result of a breach of a duty created by the contract itself. Tort law provides remedies for losses resulting from a breach of duty arising independently of any contract.

A recent case decided by Judge Conrad of the Western District of Virginia illustrates the distinction. In Raleigh Radiology, Inc. v. Eggleston and Eggleston, P.C., Raleigh Radiology (“RRI”), the plaintiff, entered into a contract with Eggleston, a practice management services business, which authorized Eggleston to manage and collect reimbursements owed to RRI for radiological services and which gave Eggleston control over RRI’s accounts in order to facilitate the process. In return for Eggleston’s work, the contract specified that RRI was to pay Eggleston $5.40 for each reimbursement it secured. Eventually, however, RRI came to believe that Eggleston had overcharged for services performed and had been billing for nonexistent reimbursements.

RRI sued Eggleston for breach of contract, unjust enrichment (a theory of implied contract) and the tort of conversion. Eggleston responded with a motion to dismiss the conversion claim on the ground that the duty breached was purely a contractual one, which precluded the filing of a tort claim. The court disagreed.