Articles Posted in Arbitration and Mediation

A court will not substitute a judicial resolution for a contractually agreed-upon remedy when two sophisticated parties negotiate a contract at arm’s length. In Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Precision Pipeline, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed a complaint where the two corporations had agreed to submit any disputes to mediation before commencing litigation and failed to do that. The basis for the dismissal, however, relied on the court’s inherent authority to control its docket, not on any lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Utility company Dominion Transmission contracted with Precision Pipeline to construct a portion of the Appalachian Gateway pipelines. The parties’ contract provided that the parties would abide by a multi-tiered, progressive alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) process before commencing litigation. In the event of a dispute, (1) the aggrieved party was to notify the other party of the dispute; if the parties could not resolve the dispute, they were required to (2) meet and discuss the issue among the project managers; then (3) proceed to a meeting of senior officers; and finally (4) proceed to mediation governed by the American Arbitration Association standards.

After Precision completed the pipelines, the parties met to close out the contract but could not reach agreement. Precision presented change order requests and filed mechanics’ liens and foreclosure actions. The parties communicated for several months, Dominion invoked its audit rights, and the parties disagreed over the amount, format and content of Precision’s required production of information. Both parties referred to the ADR provision of the contract in their communications, and counsel for the parties met at least once, but neither party initiated a meeting of senior executives or submitted the dispute to formal mediation as steps (3) and (4) of the contractual ADR provision required. Instead, Dominion filed suit in the United Pipeline.jpgStates Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and Precision moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the court lacked power to hear the case because a contractual condition precedent (submission to mediation) was not met.

Virginia Code § 8.01-581.01 et seq. evidences a public policy favoring arbitration. Virginia’s statutory scheme provides that arbitration agreements between parties are valid and enforceable, and courts uphold the parties’ designated method of appointing an arbitrator. Where the parties’ appointed arbitrator is unable to act and the parties have not provided a method of appointing a successor, the court can make an appointment. Contracting parties are presumed to know the statutory scheme, and they may alter it, but they must do so with clear and unambiguous language. In Schuiling v. Harris, the Virginia Supreme Court considered whether a clause appointing a specific arbitrator was severable from the rest of the contract or integral to the contract rendering the whole agreement unenforceable if the appointed arbitrator was unavailable.

William Schuiling hired Samantha Harris as his housekeeper. The parties signed an arbitration agreement providing that any and all disputes arising out of the employment would be resolved “exclusively by arbitration administered by the National Arbitration Forum…” The agreement also contained a severability clause stating that if any provision of the agreement was found to be invalid or unenforceable, it would be severable from the rest of the agreement and not affect any other provision. The agreement did not contain any other terms relating to non-competition, salary, wages or term of employment. The sole subject of the agreement was arbitration.

Harris filed a complaint against Schuiling alleging multiple torts, statutory violations and breach of contract. Schuiling filed a motion to compel arbitration under Virginia Code § 8.01-581.02(A). Schuiling asserted that the National Arbitration Forum scissors2.jpg(“NAF”) was no longer available to arbitrate the dispute and requested the circuit court to appoint a substitute arbitrator pursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-581.03. Harris opposed the motion, arguing that NAF’s exclusive designation was an integral part of the contract and that because NAF was unavailable, the whole agreement was unenforceable. The circuit court denied Schuiling’s motion to arbitrate, finding that the parties’ designation of NAF was an integral part of the contract and that NAF’s unavailability rendered the whole agreement unenforceable. Schuiling appealed.

Arbitrability–whether a contract creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate (rather than litigate) a particular grievance–is ordinarily a question of law to be decided by the court. Virginia, however, adheres to a public policy favoring freedom to contract. If two sophisticated businesses reach a deal providing that any arbitrability issues shall be resolved by binding arbitration rather than decided by a court, Virginia courts will enforce that agreement as written and defer to the arbitrator on questions of arbitrability.

An example is found in the recent case of Systems Research and Applications Corporation v. Rohde & Schwarz Federal System, Inc. SRA, a government contractor for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), hired Rohde & Schwarz as a subcontractor for a project involving telecommunication services equipment in Lebanon. R&S did not complete its performance by the contract deadline and SRA refused to pay its invoices. SRA took the position that the dispute was a “Government Contract Dispute” which, under the terms of the subcontract, could not be submitted to arbitration. R&S disagreed and initiated arbitration proceedings. SRA responded with a declaratory judgment action and a motion to stay the arbitration. The court denied the motion to stay and dismissed the case.

The court found that parties may provide by contract that all matters will be subject to arbitration, including questions of arbitrabilty. However, because allowing an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability is contrary to the general rule, “courts should not assume that the parties agree to arbitrate arbitrability arbitration.jpgunless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so.”

Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., will not be able to take advantage of a mandatory arbitration clause in an online agreement with a Los Angeles woman because the agreement was obtained by fraud and is therefore entirely void, a California state appeals court has held.

Amber Duick was targeted by Toyota as one of the people who would take on the role of “Player 2” in an interactive ad campaign entitled “Your Other You.” She sued Toyota and its advertising company, Saatchi & Saatchi North America, Inc., in 2009, after Toyota involved her in 2008 in an advertising campaign for its Matrix automobile as an evidently unwitting participant.

Sometime in 2008, Duick clicked a box on a Toyota-sponsored website entitled “Personality Evaluation Terms and Conditions.” The website indicated that by clicking, she was agreeing to participate in a five-day “digital experience through Your Other You,” and that she might receive emails, phone calls, or text messages from Toyota during that period. Duick soon found that instead of a personality test, she received several disconcerting emails from someone identifying himself as “Sebastian Matrix.jpgBowler,” which implied that Bowler enjoyed drinking to excess, owned a pit bull, had been running from law enforcement, and had damaged a hotel room. Duick was told that she was liable for the hotel damage, even though she had never been there and had never met Bowler. Finally, at the end of the process, Toyota revealed that this was all made up. It was a prank on Duick that was part of the ad campaign for the Matrix.

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