Discovery in the Information Age

The discovery process, the primary fact-finding tool available to litigants, has always been contentious. Parties are loathe to hand over potentially embarrassing or incriminating documents, and the costs involved can be staggering. The information age has only served to make things more complicated. As the Northern District of Illinois observed in the 2002 case of Byers v. Illinois State Police, “[m]any informal messages that were previously relayed by telephone or at the water cooler are now sent via e-mail.” Now that so many casual conversations are documented in e-mail and are, therefore, potentially subject to discovery, the discovery costs in the typical case have skyrocketed . Two recent United States District Court Cases, one out of Minnesota, Kay Beer Distributing, Inc. v. Energy Brands, Inc., and the other out of Florida, Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., provide a window into just how daunting electronic discovery can be, how judges are adapting traditional discovery rules to deal with these new problems, and how parties can do their part to avoid potential problems.

Information is generally discoverable if it is non-privileged and either directly relevant to a party’s claim or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence that is directly relevant. In the Kay Beer case, Kay alleged that an oral contract gave it the email.jpgexclusive right of distribution for Energy Brands’ products. Energy Brands claimed that by its understanding of the agreement, Kay’s distribution rights were limited. This was essentially a run-of-the-mill contract dispute. What made the case unique, however, was the plaintiff’s demand that the defendant hand over five DVDs containing nearly 13 gigabytes (between 650,000 and 975,000 pages) of e-mails and other documents. Each of the documents had been identified as referencing “Kay Beer”, “Kay Distributing”, or simply “Kay” by a keyword search of Energy Brands’ archives. Kay Beer argued that the documents might contain discoverable evidence showing that Energy Brands originally shared Kay’s understanding of their agreement.

The court’s approach to the discovery contest was to weigh Kay Beer’s interest in obtaining the documents against the burden Energy Brands would experience in turning them over. The court found that just because a document references a party does not support the conclusion that it contains relevant evidence. It further reasoned that in contract litigation, the only relevant statements are those made between the representatives of the companies involved; statements made by lower-level employees not empowered to speak for the company are not relevant to the official understanding of the contract. The court concluded that Kay Beer’s interest in the documents was relatively minor.

Turning to an examination of Energy Brands’ burden, the court noted that before the documents could be produced, Energy Brands would have to review each one for privilege and relevancy. The company estimated that the time involved in examining 650,000 to 975,000 would cost $120,000. The court found the cost unduly burdensome, and after weighing this burden against the slim possibility that relevant evidence might be discovered, held that Kay was not entitled to the requested discovery.

Kilpatrick differed slightly in fact but was consistent in outcome. Kilpatrick, the plaintiff, claimed that the pain pump manufactured by the defendant, Breg, and used in his October, 2004 shoulder surgery gave him a condition called chondrolysis. Kilpatrick’s suit alleged that Breg knew of the risk of chondrolysis but marketed the product regardless of the dangers and without warning. Just weeks before trial, Kilpatrick demanded the production of nearly 6 years’ worth of Breg’s archived, intra-office e-mails. In depositions, several Breg employees testified inaccurately that they learned of the risk of chondrolysis in March of 2006, when documents obtained by Kilpatrick indicated clearly that the risk was known as early as December of 2005. Kilpatrick theorized the misstatements were part of a cover-up and sought extensive discovery to substantiate the theory.

Performing a balancing test similar to that in Kay Beer, the court first looked to the likelihood that relevant evidence would be discovered in the requested e-mails. The court acknowledged that the inaccurate testimony did raise some suspicions, but noted there was no evidence in the record indicated Breg knew of the chondrolysis risk prior to December 2005. The court found the misstatements were likely honest mistakes, reasoning that the depositions occurred nearly three years after the events in question and that the deponents were only off by about three months in their statements.

The court then took into account the significant burden such extensive, last-minute discovery would place on Breg. It denied the requested discovery in light of this burden, but granted Kilpatrick a limited right to further explore the Breg employees’ misstatements by allowing discovery into a sampling of the archived e-mails, at Kilpatrick’s expense.

This balanced approach to electronic discovery shows that seemingly antiquated discovery rules are still applicable in this new age. While some flexibility is required, a little common sense can make a complicated scenario a little more manageable. That being understood, a party, when making discovery requests, would be wise to be mindful of the opposing party’s position and attempt to curb any burden the request might impose. Such a measured approach can help tip the balancing test in your favor.

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