Virginia Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

In Virginia, an action for trespass is no longer the only remedy a landowner has against a trespasser. A Norfolk judge recently held that a landowner may sue for rent even in the absence of an express or implied lease agreement. A duty to pay rent can arise under the doctrine known as quantum meruit.

In the case of City of Norfolk v. Muladhara, LLC, Norfolk managed several lots of prime commercial real estate on which the city collected rents. The Defendant, Muladhara, began conducting business on one of the lots without ever receiving permission from Norfolk. Upon discovering the trespasser, Norfolk informed Muladhara that the city managed the land and collected rent for its use. This conversation prompted the Defendant to pay the back rent the city claimed was due. However, Muladhara continued to occupy the space without any further payment.

The court held that Norfolk may base its claim for recovery on two distinct theories. First, the court found that the conversation between the city and Muladhara that led to the payment of back rent could form the basis of an implied contract. Judge Hall clearly laid out the three elements of an implied contract: offer, acceptance, and a meeting of the minds. Simply put, the city offered to overlook the previous trespass if Muladhara paid back rent, and Muladhara accepted the offer. Even though this agreement only covered Muladhara's past occupation of the parcel, the Defendant's payment of back rent constituted a meeting of the minds as to the rental value of the land. Should Muladhara continue to occupy the land, the meeting of the minds forms the content of the implied contract. The city, therefore, is allowed to sue for payment of rent due, and the amount will be determined by looking to the parties' prior agreement.

Implied contract is a fairly common vehicle for the collection of rent when no formal agreement exists. The court, however, added a new tool to the landowner's toolbox: quantum meruit, or quasi-contract. This differs from an implied contract in that a meeting of the minds (the basic terms of the contract) is not necessary. All that is required is that the city reasonably expected to be compensated for the use of its land, and that the trespasser, aware of the city's reasonable expectation, still made use of the land. Historically, quantum meruit only applied to a plaintiff's services or materials consumed by the defendant, not to a defendant's use of real property. But, as Judge Hall pointed out, the Virginia Supreme Court has defined quantum meruit to apply whenever a defendant "acquires property of another," and real property need not be excluded from this definition. Consequently, no established precedent prevents a plaintiff from pursuing the reasonable rental value of the property even if no agreement was ever reached concerning the value of the property.

The Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) and the Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company (TrAILCo) plan to build a 265-mile, 500-kilovolt transmission line between Loudoun County, Virginia, and Washington County, Pennsylvania. They claim that due to rapid growth in the Washington, DC metro area, energy consumption along the Potomac will likely continue to grow to levels unsupportable by the current infrastructure, and the anticipated blackouts and line failures would put them in violation of federal regulations. The State Corporation Commission approved the power line, and after a challenge by the Piedmont Environmental Council, the Supervisors of Fauquier County, Prince William County, and Culpeper County, and other interested groups, the Supreme Court upheld the construction permits.

In the case of Piedmont v. VEPCO, the court shed some light on the role of Virginia's State Corporation Commission in developing an effective and efficient system for energy production and distribution. First, before new lines of that size can be constructed, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) must find that they are needed to avoid regulatory violations. Second, regardless of federal approval, because the proposed placement of the lines was in Virginia, approval must be obtained from the State Corporation Commission, to whom regulatory authority has been delegated by the Virginia legislature.

The plaintiffs argued, and the court acknowledged, that the federal approval process heavily favors new transmission line construction over other possible solutions such as demand-side regulation, new power generation, and conservation efforts. The Commission, on the other hand, is required by the Commonwealth to consider the viability of these other possible solutions. Therefore, the plaintiffs claimed, the Commission's reliance on the NERC's findings was flawed because the federal process is biased against alternative solutions. The plaintiffs demanded that the Commission independently investigate alternative solutions and require them to be incorporated into their interstate operations.

The Virginia Supreme Court, while agreeing with the plaintiffs in spirit, affirmed the SCC's approval. Justice Koontz noted that the Commission's duty to independently investigate all applications for new transmission line construction does not prevent the Commission from considering data that may be biased by a federal regulatory process that seeks different goals. Further, the Court held that even if alternative solutions were feasible, a state regulatory agency lacks the authority to require that action be taken on an interstate scale. Finally, the Court held that the Commission's role is not to dictate interstate policy but to determine if a proposal will serve the anticipated needs of Virginia residents. The Commission's decision was upheld because it critically reviewed all arguments and data, and its decision was reasonably based on the facts and current law.