Virginia Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

A Swedish law firm has failed in its effort to sue a director of a former client for "misrepresentation" in Virginia federal court after the court ruled the claim was barred by Virginia's two-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence claims. The law firm had conceded that it would be unable to maintain a cause of action for fraud under the laws of Virginia, and the court opted to analyze the viability of the claim as a negligence action.

The law firm, Andersson Gustafsson Advokatbyra KB, sued eSCRUB Systems, Inc., a Virginia company, and three people associated with the company, claiming that eSCRUB had failed to pay the firm's legal bills after it hired the law firm in 2007 to help it resolve a dispute. The law firm alleged that John Packard, a former director of eSCRUB, committed fraud in that he breached a "continuing obligation to notify Andersson of the risks of non-payment it ran in performing services for eSCRUB." The allegation was essentially that Packard was part of a scheme to induce the law firm to provide legal services to eSCRUB with the full knowledge that the company would never pay the firm's legal fees.

In Virginia, negligence claims carry a two-year statute of limitations. Virginia follows the general rule that the event that starts the limitations clock ticking is the negligent act itself. There is no "discovery exception" that starts the clock at a later date, such as the date the plaintiff actually discovers that the alleged negligence occurred or that he has been damaged. Statutes of limitation can expire before a potential plaintiff even learns of the grounds for a lawsuit.

The judge found that the alleged injury occurred in December 2007, when the law firm's invoices first came due and eSCRUB refused to pay. The law firm contended that the injury occurred even earlier, in November 2007, when the law firm first started working for eSCRUB. The judge said that an alternative date would be May 8, 2008, when the law firm terminated its services to eSCRUB. But any of those dates are more than two years before the lawsuit was filed on June 8, 2010, so the claim was deemed time-barred and the court entered summary judgment for the defendant.

Once a plaintiff has introduced evidence to establish a "badge of fraud," a prima facie case of fraudulent conveyance is established and the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that the transaction was not fraudulent. So held the Virginia Supreme Court, in reversing the Henrico County Circuit Court's decision to strike the plaintiff's evidence and enter judgment in favor of the defendant.

Fox Rest Associates, L.P. v. Anne B. Little involved a dispute between George B. Little, an attorney and the general partner of Fox Rest Apartments, and the limited partners of Fox Rest Apartments, arising out of an alleged sale of the apartments by the general partner without the consent or knowledge of the limited partners. After learning that the limited partners planned to sue him, Mr. Little made various transfers, including transfers into an account at SunTrust Bank held jointly with his wife. The limited partners filed a derivative action against Fox Rest for malpractice, double billing, and other claims. The limited partners obtained a judgment but were unable to collect approximately $856,400. They then proceeded to file a fraudulent conveyance action to attempt to set aside various transfers as fraudulent.

The trial court struck the limited partners' evidence, finding that they had produced insufficient evidence of fraudulent intent. The Supreme Court, however, reversed. Under Virginia law, it pointed out, to survive a motion to strike, a plaintiff need only introduce evidence of "badges of fraud." Badges (or presumptions) of fraud include:

(1) retention of an interest in the transferred property by the transferor; (2) transfer between family members for allegedly antecedent debt; (3) pursuit of the transferor or threat of litigation by his creditors at the time of the transfer; (4) lack of or gross inadequacy of consideration for the conveyance; (5) retention or possession of the property by transferor; and (6) fraudulent incurrence of indebtedness after the conveyance.

Here, the court found, the limited partners had proved the existence of several of these badges of fraud. First, Little maintained an interest in the funds deposited in the SunTrust account since it was a joint account. Second, the transfers were made after the dispute arose over his management of Fox Rest, the dispute that led to the derivative suit. Additionally, the Supreme Court found that it was fair to assume that Little's wife knew of his fraudulent intent since she was aware of the problems between her husband and the limited partners and of the lawsuit. An accountant testified at trial that Mrs. Little received a minimum benefit of $940,000 from the challenged transfers. This, the court said, established a prima facie case of fraudulent conveyance.

Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., will not be able to take advantage of a mandatory arbitration clause in an online agreement with a Los Angeles woman because the agreement was obtained by fraud and is therefore entirely void, a California state appeals court has held.

Amber Duick was targeted by Toyota as one of the people who would take on the role of "Player 2" in an interactive ad campaign entitled "Your Other You." She sued Toyota and its advertising company, Saatchi & Saatchi North America, Inc., in 2009, after Toyota involved her in 2008 in an advertising campaign for its Matrix automobile as an evidently unwitting participant.

Sometime in 2008, Duick clicked a box on a Toyota-sponsored website entitled "Personality Evaluation Terms and Conditions." The website indicated that by clicking, she was agreeing to participate in a five-day "digital experience through Your Other You," and that she might receive emails, phone calls, or text messages from Toyota during that period. Duick soon found that instead of a personality test, she received several disconcerting emails from someone identifying himself as "Sebastian Bowler," which implied that Bowler enjoyed drinking to excess, owned a pit bull, had been running from law enforcement, and had damaged a hotel room. Duick was told that she was liable for the hotel damage, even though she had never been there and had never met Bowler. Finally, at the end of the process, Toyota revealed that this was all made up. It was a prank on Duick that was part of the ad campaign for the Matrix.

Duick suited Toyota and Saatchi for $10 million in California state court for damages and other relief, claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and false advertising. Toyota moved to compel arbitration and take the case out of the court system. The trial court refused to compel arbitration, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.

The appeals court reasoned that the contract with Duick, including the arbitration clause, was void and unenforceable because it was obtained by fraud "in the inception"; in other words, that Duick was deceived by Toyota and Saatchi as to the nature of the act she was performing when she clicked the box. Thus there was no valid and enforceable contract.

The defendants "led Duick to believe that she was going to participate in a personality evaluation and nothing more," the court wrote. "In particular, a reasonable reader in Duick's position would not have known that she was signing up to be the target of a prank. It might have been possible to draft the terms and conditions in such a way as to correct that a misimpression, but defendants did not do so." Accordingly, the contract, including the arbitration clause, was held void and unenforceable under California law.

What kind of expense amounts to a "loss" under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), and did a Virginia litigation-support company incur the required minimum of $5,000 in losses when it investigated an alleged breach of its computer systems, retaining the services of both an attorney and a computer forensics company to aid with the investigation? That was the issue recently before Judge T.S. Ellis III of the Eastern District of Virginia, who held that the investigative activities could support a CFAA claim, even if the expenses were not paid in cash.

The issue was particularly important to the plaintiff, Animators at Law, a graphics and technology litigation support company, because of the 13 claims it brought against two former employees and a competitor, all but the CFAA claim were based on state law, meaning that without it, there would be no basis for federal-court jurisdiction.

The CFAA provides for a civil action against anyone who intentionally gains access to a computer without authorization and obtains information from it. The CFAA has a minimum jurisdictional requirement of $5,000 in losses. Animators at Law claimed that its former employees conspired with a competitor to leave Animators' employment and join the competitor, taking with them confidential and proprietary information about Animators' services, projects, and clients.

When Ken Lopez, the president of Animators at Law, suspected that one of his company's laptops had been accessed without authorization, he brought in an outside company to engage in a forensic analysis of the laptop. Evidence produced during the litigation showed that Animators received services valued at $19,501.41 or more in connection with investigating the unauthorized access. However, Animators did not actually pay the contractor for its services, prompting the defendants to move for summary judgment on the basis that the $5,000 jurisdictional threshold had not been met. Animators countered that it provided services to the contractor in exchange for its forensic services, as a form of barter.

The court found that it "would be passing strange" if the contractor had spent over 60 hours analyzing Animators' data without any expectation of payment in some form. At a minimum, the court ruled, there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the services were provided on credit or in trade, given that there was an existing business relationship between Animators and the contractor. Because the CFAA does not require losses to be paid for in cash, this was sufficient to survive summary judgment.

A U.S. district judge in Virginia has ruled that a restaurant chain operator is liable for breach of contract and is obligated to pay a franchise consulting company for sales and marketing services that the consultant performed for the chain under the contract between the two companies. Rejecting the contract defenses of lack of standing, fraudulent inducement, lack of specificity, lack of mutuality, and unconscionability, U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis, III, of the Eastern District of Virginia, granted summary judgment in favor of the consultant.

The case arose from a 2008 contract between Freshii Development, LLC, which owns a chain of healthy fast-food restaurants, and Fransmart, LLC, an Alexandria, Va.-based company that agreed, in exchange for a percentage of franchise fees and revenues, to help Freshii expand by finding appropriate franchisees for its restaurants. In early 2010, Fransmart restructured its business and set up a new company to which it assigned its contracts and transferred its assets and liabilities. Freshii then stopped paying Fransmart under the contract, and Fransmart sued for breach. Freshii asserted five defenses to the lawsuit, all of which Judge Ellis rejected.

Freshii first argued that Fransmart lacked standing because the 2008 agreement was a personal services contract and therefore not assignable to a separate entity (such as the "new Fransmart") without Freshii's consent. Judge Ellis rejected this defense, noting that many aspects of the agreement led to the conclusion that it was not a personal services contract. For example, the agreement was between two corporate entities, it was for a duration of ten years, and it did not identify any individual as being material to performance. In any event, the judge wrote, it was not necessary to reach that issue because the contract contained a "successors and assigns" clause, stating that "the provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and to their successors and assigns." This language, the court found, demonstrated that the parties intended the agreement to be assignable to a successor entity like the new Fransmart.

Next, Freshii argued that Fransmart fraudulently induced it to enter into the contract by misrepresenting its business model for marketing franchises and its financial strength. The judge found, however, that under Virginia law, promises regarding future actions such as promised marketing activities don't constitute fraud. In addition, there was insufficient evidence that Freshii relied on these statements. The claims regarding Fransmart's financial condition also didn't constitute fraud because there wasn't clear and convincing evidence that Fransmart was actually in financial trouble and because its opinions about its future viability can't be the basis of fraud claims in Virginia.

Freshii also asserted that the contract was unenforceable for lack of specificity regarding Fransmart's obligations. Judge Ellis ruled that the marketing and sales contract contained "all the essential terms required for a services contract under Virginia law," and that contractual terms requiring "marketing" and "selling" were specific enough to be enforceable.

Freshii asserted that the contract was invalid for lack of mutuality because its only recourse in the event of breach was termination of the contract. Judge Ellis found, however, that nothing in the contract prohibited Freshii from suing for breach of contract and damages.

Finally, Freshii argued that the agreement was unenforceable because it contained unconscionable terms. Judge Ellis replied that these were sophisticated businessmen entering into an arms-length deal and that there was insufficient evidence of unconscionability. Freshii may have been unhappy with the deal, but that didn't constitute grounds to void it.

Too often, disgruntled departing employees will abuse their employer's computer system on their way out, snooping into coworkers' email accounts, erasing important files, downloading trade secrets or other confidential commercial information, or intentionally infecting computers with viruses. In recent years, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) has become an important weapon in an employer's arsenal for combating such computer crimes. Civil remedies are available under the CFAA for damage to any "protected computer," which includes any "computer used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication." However, a Virginia court recently clarified that the CFAA will not provide a remedy absent an actual "loss" as defined by the statute.

In Global Policy Partners, LLC, v. Yessin, a plaintiff brought claims against her husband and business partner under the CFAA and the Stored Communications Act (SCA), claiming that he had accessed her work email account in order to review her confidential communications with her divorce lawyer. The court rejected the husband's initial attempts to dismiss the case on the ground that his access to his wife's email was authorized in that he was a co-manager of the couple's business. The court reasoned that because there was no legitimate business reason for the snooping, the access was unauthorized. At the summary judgment stage, however, the court granted summary judgment in his favor because the wife did not introduce sufficient evidence to show she had incurred a $5,000 "loss."

To prevail on a claim brought under the CFAA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged violation "caused ... loss ... aggregating at least $5,000 in value." 18 U.S.C. Section 1030(c)(4)(A)(i). The CFAA specifically defines four categories of potential loss: "[i] the cost of responding to an offense, [ii] [costs of] conducting a damage assessment, and [iii] [costs of] restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and [iv] any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of the interruption of service." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11). According to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, this list "plainly contemplates ... costs incurred as part of the response to a CFAA violation, including the investigation of an offense." A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 646 (4th Cir. 2009).

Just because an unauthorized person reads an e-mail, however, does not necessarily mean that he is liable under the CFAA. In order to recover damages under the CFAA, a plaintiff must establish three main facts: (1) A violation of the plaintiff's computer system; (2) costs incurred by the plaintiff due to the violation, and (3) those costs must aggregate to $5,000 or more. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. The court indicated that it would view critically a plaintiff's post hoc claims that a violation "caused" costs to be incurred simply because money was spent subsequent to the violations. Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) only compensates for "reasonable" costs, so a plaintiff must establish, not only that the defendant's violation caused the plaintiff to suffer costs but that those costs were a reasonably foreseeable result of the violation. The court held that even if a defendant breaks into a plaintiff's computer system and reads email without authority, that would not give the plaintiff a blank check to perform system updates that were not reasonably necessary to restore and re-secure the system.

If a victim of computer fraud can establish a loss, however, the CFAA offers a potentially powerful deterrent in the form of a federal cause of action.

When a couple of home buyers in Loudoun County filed a lawsuit against Ritz-Carlton and a Loudoun developer, they chose Loudoun County Circuit Court as the forum. The immediate response of the defendants' lawyers was to remove the case to federal court, where summary judgment is much easier to obtain than in Virginia state court. The home buyers, likely worried about having their case dismissed at an early stage by a federal judge, sought to remand the case back to Loudoun County, pointing to a forum-selection clause which provided: "In connection with any litigation between Buyer and Seller arising out of this Agreement...[t]he sole venue for any litigation shall be Loudoun County, Virginia." The court refused to send the case back to state court. All of that procedural maneuvering meant very little in the end, however, as the court recently denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to go forward.

In Nahigian v. Ritz-Carlton, LLC, the home buyers (the Nahigians) claim the defendants fraudulently induced them into buying property by making multiple misrepresentations about the nature and extent of the involvement of the prestigious Ritz-Carlton company in the management of the property and its adjoining private golf course. The Nahigians allege they were duped into buying an expensive property at Creighton Farms near Leesburg by various statements by sales agents referring to the development as a "Ritz-Carlton community" and part of the "Ritz-Carlton Life." As it turned out, they allege, Ritz-Carlton was merely a temporary manager of the golf club and never had any long-term commitment to the neighborhood. In March of 2009, Ritz-Carlton announced they were pulling out of the development.

The Nahigians sued for fraud and related claims, and the defendants moved for dismissal, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity, and that they failed to allege all the requisite elements of a fraud claim. The court disagreed and denied the motions to dismiss.

The court laid out the basic elements of fraud as: "(1) a false representation, (2) of a material fact, (3) made intentionally and knowingly, (4) with intent to mislead, (5) reliance by the party misled, and (6) resulting damage to the party misled." Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), each element of fraud must be plead with the required degree of specificity identifying "at a minimum...the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation."

The plaintiffs had alleged only that the misrepresentations were made by "Juno/Ritz representatives." However, the court found that Rule 9(b)'s specificity requirement does not require that the full name of the person making the statement be identified. The court found the allegations of the Complaint sufficient because the defendants had been made amply aware of the "particular circumstances for which they will have to prepare a defense." The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the reliance element was lacking because the contract specifically disclaimed reliance on outside statements. The court reasoned that the terms of a contract fraudulently induced cannot preclude a Plaintiff from bringing suit for that fraud.

Even in Virginia, which recently placed first in a ranking of the "Best States for Business" by Forbes.com, businesses often fail. Particularly in small companies, relationships among the owners sour and partnership disputes arise. Here in Fairfax County, where my practice is located, it is not uncommon for disgruntled partners to attempt to withdraw large sums from corporate bank accounts prior to dissolution or to attempt to block other owners' access to the company's accounts. Banks need to be careful not to get caught in the crossfire by inadvertently facilitating a wrongful cash grab by one of the business owners. Fortunately, as illustrated by a recent decision by Fairfax Judge Bellows, Virginia's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code provides some valuable protection to banks.

Khan v. Alliance Bank (Fairfax Circuit Court, Dec. 22, 2009) involved a dispute between two owners of Advantage Title and Escrow, LLC, Khan and Kazmi. Both were authorized signatories on the company's account held with Alliance Bank. After the two had a falling out, Kazmi instructed the bank to remove Khan as a signatory. A few days later, Khan wrote a $35,000 check against Advantage Title's account in exchange for a cashier's check for that amount. Upon learning of the transaction, Kazmi sent an "Affidavit of Unauthorized Transaction" to Alliance Bank. This document alleged, under oath, that Khan obtained the cashier's check through fraud as Khan was (according to Kazmi) not authorized to withdraw funds from the company's account. In reliance on that affidavit, Alliance Bank canceled the cashier's check and credited $35,000 back to the Advantage account.

Normally, putting a stop-payment order on a check is not a big deal. But cashier's checks, which are governed by the UCC, are different. Unlike personal checks, cashier's checks carry a promise of the bank to the holder. For that reason Khan sued Alliance Bank, claiming that the promise was unconditional and that, by terminating payment, Alliance was liable to Khan for breach of contract and conversion.

The court disagreed and threw out the case. Under the applicable provisions of the UCC, a bank will only be liable for canceling a cashier's check if the bank acted "wrongfully." A bank is justified in refusing to honor a cashier's check if the bank "asserts a claim or defense of the bank that it has reasonable grounds to believe is available against the person entitled to enforce the instrument" or the bank "has a reasonable doubt whether the person demanding payment is the person entitled to enforce the instrument." See Va. Code § 8.3A-411(c).

In this case, Kazmi's affidavit gave Alliance Bank all the protection it needed. The affidavit (like all affidavits) was made under oath, and its allegations were reasonable on their face. Therefore, the court found, the sworn statement provided the bank with reasonable grounds to believe the check was procured by fraud, which is a defense to the negotiability of the check. Alliance Bank did not act "wrongfully" within the meaning of the UCC, so the court dismissed the case.

Fraud is a word that is thrown around a lot in everyday life. When pundits discuss the latest political or Wall Street scandal, the discussion often turns to the bad actors' "fraudulent" behavior. In ordinary, non-legal parlance, the word fraud can mean anything from merely bad intent to criminal behavior. Outside the courtroom, accusing someone of fraud is generally synonymous with calling that person a cheat or a swindler. Sometimes this casual definition of fraud will overlap with the legal definition, but more often it does not. The law does not consider every act of dishonesty to amount to actionable fraud. You may be owed compensation, however, if you have truly been defrauded in a legal sense.

Actionable fraud requires more than just broken promises or a breach of contract. The law looks more harshly upon fraud. It is considered a tort, for which punitive damages are available. (Punitive damages are not recoverable in actions for breach of contract). Because a successful fraud claim will usually result in a higher damages award than an ordinary contract claim, lawyers often try to convert a contract claim into a fraud claim through artful drafting of their client's complaint. Under Virginia law, a party alleging fraud must prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) a false representation, (2) of a present, material fact, (3) made intentionally and knowingly, (4) with intent to mislead, (5) reasonable reliance by the party misled, and (6) resulting damage to him. (See Thompson v. Bacon, 245 Va. 107, 111 (1993)). Let's take a closer look at these elements.

1. False Representation. This is the essence of a fraud claim. The defendant must have misrepresented the truth. If somebody steals your wallet but does not communicate with you, you have not been "defrauded" and cannot maintain a fraud action against that person. (You would have other remedies you could pursue, but the correct legal theory would not be fraud because no misrepresentation was made).

2. Present, Material Fact. The defendant must have made a misrepresentation about a present fact. A fact is present only if it could have been definitively determined at the time the misrepresentation was made. It is not a promise that something will or will not happen in the future. For example, if a car salesman promises a car will resell in 10 years for at least half of its new value, it is not a fraudulent statement even if it proves untrue. This is because, at the time the statement was made, its falsity could not be known. If, however, that same salesman promises that the car has anti-lock brakes when it, in fact, does not, then the statement can form the basis for fraud.

The misrepresented fact must also be material in some respect. For example, when a fraudulent statement is made in connection with a commercial transaction, materiality means that the fact must go to the essence of the deal itself (the thing being bargained for), and it must be of such importance that the deal hinges upon its being true. Going back to the car sale, the lie about the anti-lock brakes is material because it concerns the car, the thing the parties are bargaining for, and, because anti-lock brakes are an important safety device, if the car did not have them it is likely that a sale would not be made. If, however, the car salesman had lied by stating that he, like the potential buyer, was a former Boy Scout, then the misrepresentation would not be deemed material because the deal concerned the sale of a car and the lie had nothing whatsoever to do with the car.

3, 4. Intent. A fraud case arises when a defendant intentionally lies about something and does so for a reason. While a separate tort of "negligent misrepresentation" exists, the tort of fraud does not supply a cause of action against someone who mistakenly misrepresents a fact. The bad actor must have intentionally misrepresented the truth, with the further intent of inducing you to rely on the statement to your detriment.

5. Reasonable Reliance. You cannot sue someone for fraud, even if that person lied to you, if you didn't take any action in reliance on the statement. For example, if you don't believe the false statement, then you haven't really been defrauded. If you do believe the misrepresentation and rely on it, then your reliance must be reasonable. The law will only grant relief to those who act prudently and with ordinary care for their own well being. If common sense dictates that a quick phone call or Google search could verify the defendant's statement, but you decide unwisely to simple accept the person's statement as true without independent verification, a court may deny you any recovery. In the used-car scenario, your fraud claim against the salesman would likely be defeated if a prominently displayed sticker on the car read "NO ANTI-LOCK BRAKES" and you chose to ignore it.

6. Damages. Finally, the plaintiff must have suffered damages as a result of the false statement. The law strongly believes in the "no harm, no foul" concept.

The above criteria are the essential elements of a civil action for fraud. There is much more to it than is commonly understood. If you or your business have been wronged by another but your fact pattern does not fit within the legal definition of fraud, not all hope is lost. There are several paths to recovery in Virginia's courts. Meet with a Virginia lawyer to learn whether you are entitled to monetary or non-monetary relief under the law.

To file a lawsuit in Virginia's state or federal courts against a non-resident of Virginia or an out-of-state corporation, it is necessary to establish "personal jurisdiction" over the defendant. A court has no power over parties to a lawsuit absent such jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction will exist only if (1) Virginia's "long-arm" statute authorizes it; and (2) the defendant has certain "minimum contacts" with Virginia "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," which is required by constitutional due process. In a recent case from the Eastern District of Virginia, Judge Trenga held that a passive website not purposefully targeted at Virginians was not sufficient to create a basis for personal jurisdiction and he dismissed the case.

The case, which contains counts for actual fraud, constructive fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, was filed by Dr. Olimpia Rosario, a Virginia psychiatrist, against professional psychic Jeffrey Wands, who operates Psychic Eye Media in New York. Dr. Rosario became impressed with Mr. Wands several years ago when he correctly predicted that she would obtain a residency in a New York-based hospital. Ever since, Dr. Rosario has sought counseling and guidance from Mr. Wands on a wide range of issues, including spiritual issues and substance abuse problems, despite the fact he held no degree or license to practice any type of healing art, medicine, counseling, or social work in either Virginia or New York.

Eventually, Mr. Wands became concerned about certain of Dr. Rosario's behavior and reported it to both the New York Police Department and the Virginia Board of Medicine. Dr. Rosario sued, claiming Mr. Wands caused her condition to worsen and denying abuse of prescription drugs. Mr. Wands, a resident of New York, moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Dr. Rosario's main argument in support of jurisdiction was that Mr. Wands maintained a website accessible to residents of Virginia (as well as everyone else in the world having an Internet connection) and touting a national following. The court disagreed that such a website was sufficient to establish a "presence" in Virginia sufficient to form a basis for personal jurisdiction. Citing a Fourth Circuit case, the court noted that "a person who simply places information on the Internet does not subject himself to jurisdiction in each State into which the electronic signal is transmitted." There were no allegations that Mr. Wands' website was interactive or that users could conduct transactions through the website. The court also noted the absence of any facts demonstrating that Mr. Wands was intentionally targeting citizens of Virginia. For these reasons, the court found general jurisdiction lacking.

Specific jurisdiction was also found to be absent. This more limited type of jurisdiction, the court noted, exists when a defendant "purposefully directed his activities at the residents of the forum" and the plaintiff's causes of action "arise out of those activities" (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). In Virginia, courts must consider the following in determining whether specific jurisdiction should be asserted: "(1) the extent to which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the plaintiffs' claims arise out of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable" (citing Consulting Eng'rs Corp. v. Geometric, Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 278 (4th Cir. 2009)). Dr. Rosario argued that Mr. Wands purposefully directed his activities at Virginia when, for seven years, he and Dr. Rosario participated in quarterly telephone discussions. The court found such minimal contact insufficient, especially since Mr. Wands never physically came to Virginia for any of those discussions.

D.C. has brought an action in D.C. Superior Court against several computer-leasing companies, charging them with deceiving numerous church congregations into paying hundreds of thousands of dollars for unneeded or broken computer equipment. 

In the lawsuit, filed last Wednesday, the city claims that United Leasing Associates of America, Television Broadcasting Online, and others hatched a plan to offer "free" computer equipment to hundreds of area church congregations, but then trick them into signing papers binding them to long-term lease payments of $50,000 or more.  The equipment, marketed by the defendants as "information kiosks" designed to help congregations communicate with members of the community and post job listings, consisted of ordinary desktop computers disguised in mahogany casing.  Those congregations who refused to pay the exorbitant monthly fees suffered harm to their credit rating.

Businesses need to conduct their operations in good faith and deal fairly with their customers.  An action for fraud and deceit arises when a defendant makes (1) a false representation (2) in reference to material fact, (3) made with knowledge of its falsity, (4) with the intent to deceive, which (5) causes the subject of the fraud to take action in reliance upon the representation.  See Atraqchi v. GUMC Unified Billing Servs., 788 A.2d 559, 563 (D.C. 2002).  Stated more simply, you commit fraud if you lie to someone for the purpose of tricking them into doing something, and the person falls for it.  Virginia has similar laws prohibiting fraudulent business transactions. 

In this case, according to the Complaint, the defendants tricked the congregations into signing the leases by assuring them (falsely) that all lease payments would be paid by advertisers and sponsors, and that the congregations would have "no financial liability" whatsoever.  (Note: never rely on others (except your lawyer) to tell you what a document says, especially a contract that you are signing.  When you sign a contract, you become bound by what the words actually say, not by what you assume they say based on the representations of others).

The lawsuit seeks an order that the defendants immediately stop the unlawful activity, that the fraudulent contracts be undone, and that each defendant pay attorney fees and civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each violation of the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (found at D.C. Code §§ 28-3901 through 28-3911 (2001)).