Virginia Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

In Virginia, employment is presumed to be at-will, but that presumption can be rebutted with evidence that the employment is for a specific period of time or that it can be terminated only for just cause. Virginia law says that contracts are to be construed as written and if the terms of the contract are clear, then those terms are to be given their plain meaning. A separate writing that is referenced in a written contract is construed as part of that agreement only if it is referred to with specificity and there is some expression of an intent to incorporate its terms into the agreement. As explained in a recent opinion by Judge Bruce D. White of Fairfax, "in order to incorporate the provisions of another document into the employment contract, the plain language of the employment contract must clearly reference and incorporate the terms of the document being incorporated."

Johnson v. Versar was a lawsuit brought by William Johnson, Alexis Kayanan and Davy Jon Daniels against their former employer Versar, a government contractor based in Springfield, Virginia, for alleged breach of their employment contracts. They claimed that their employment was not at-will but was for a definite term. They based their argument on the fact that they received certain documents upon accepting employment that referenced Versar's by-laws, which provided that officers "may be removed" by a majority vote of the board of directors. Because a resolution was never passed, they claimed that they were terminated in violation of their employment agreements.

Judge White sustained Versar's demurrer with prejudice and dismissed the case. The Court found that the plaintiffs were at-will employees because the by-laws were not specifically and intentionally incorporated into the employment agreement. None of the offer letters referenced the by-laws, and the accompanying documents that did reference the by-laws did not indicate any intent to incorporate their terms as part of the employment agreement.

The Court went on to say that even if the by-laws were incorporated into the employment contract, the language of the by-laws was not strong enough to overcome the plaintiffs' at-will status. The by-laws only provided for how an officer "may" be removed. The use of that permissive word indicates that the possibilities for removal were not intended to be exhaustive. The by-laws did not provide that the employees could be removed only for just cause or that their employment was for a definite term, so their employment was deemed to be at-will.

Does an employer have any sort of ownership interest in its employees' tweets or Twitter following? This very current social-media question may be tested in a lawsuit originally filed last July in federal court in California by PhoneDog, a South Carolina-based company that reviews mobile phones and services online, against former employee Noah Kravitz. An amended complaint in the case, filed on November 29, 2011, has attracted considerable media attention.

When Kravitz worked for PhoneDog as a product reviewer and video blogger from 2006 to 2010, he tweeted under the handle @PhoneDog_Noah and attracted some 17,000 followers for his comments and opinions on Twitter. When he left the company, he continued tweeting under the name @NoahKravitz. But he didn't create a new account with that name; instead, he kept the account (with all its followers) and just changed the Twitter handle to @NoahKravitz. Eight months later, PhoneDog sued Kravitz, alleging that his continued use of the account and his tweeting to his followers constitute a misappropriation of PhoneDog's trade secrets, intentional interference with prospective economic relationships, and conversion. Phone Dog said that it had suffered loss of advertising revenue as a result and that Kravitz "was unjustly enriched by obtaining the business of PhoneDog's Followers."

PhoneDog essentially claims ownership rights due to the fact that it directs its employees to maintain Twitter accounts and instructs them to tweet links to PhoneDog's website, thus increasing PhoneDog's page views and generating advertising revenue for PhoneDog. PhoneDog said in the complaint that since Kravitz now works for TechnoBuffalo, a competitor of PhoneDog, he is exploiting PhoneDog's confidential information on behalf of a competitor. PhoneDog is seeking $340,000 in damages -- $2.50 per month per Twitter follower for eight months. Although PhoneDog said in the complaint that "industry standards" peg the value of a Twitter follower at $2.50 per month, the company did not give a source for that estimate. Nor did PhoneDog attempt to distinguish between people who followed Kravitz because of his connection to PhoneDog and those followers who are merely friends of his or enjoy his commentary.

In my view, this would be a solid case if Kravitz was bound by a non-competition or non-solicitation agreement. The allegations are essentially that Kravitz took a list of 17,000 PhoneDog followers and is now soliciting business from them on behalf of a new company. Such conduct would normally violate a standard non-solicitation agreement. In the absence of a noncompete, the case is weaker but raises some interesting issues. It's not quite the same as the typical case involving theft of customer lists because, unlike in most of those cases, Twitter followers' identities are not private. Kravitz didn't need to assume control over the Twitter account in order to solicit business from those followers; doing so just made things easier for him. At a minimum, I think the intentional interference claim will stick. Kravitz should have started a new Twitter account and invited people to follow him there, not simply changed the name on the account. That's risky business.

The Virginia Supreme Court ruled on November 4, 2011, that membership in a Virginia limited liability company is comprised of two components--a control interest and a financial interest--and that only the financial interest is transferable by will when a member dies. Moreover, the court held that a devisee or assignee of a financial interest has no control interest in the limited liability company without becoming a member, just as a control interest in a partnership "cannot be bestowed on another by the unilateral act of a partner."

The financial interest involves only the right to share in the company's profits and losses and to receive distributions. It does not entail the right to participate in the management or control of the company's affairs.

In 1991, the Virginia legislature enacted the Limited Liability Company Act, creating the limited liability company as a hybrid entity, similar in some respects to a partnership and in other respects to a corporation. The statute provides that the transferability of a member's interest in an LLC should be similar to the transferability of a partner's interest in a partnership. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, the transfer of a partner's interest in a partnership entitles the transferee only to the financial rights, not the control rights.

The case arose after Admiral Dewey Monroe Jr. died in 2004. He and his wife, Lou Ann Monroe, had formed a Virginia LLC in which Dewey held an 80 percent interest and Lou Ann a 20 percent interest. The operating agreement provided that upon Dewey's death, Lou Ann would become managing member and Joseph Monroe would become the successor managing member. When Dewey died, it was discovered that his will bequeathed his entire estate to his daughter, Janet Ott. Janet asserted that this bequest transferred his membership in the company to her, including the right to control the company with the 80 percent interest. Acting on that assumption, she promptly called a meeting of the Company and proceeded to putatively remove Lou Ann and Joseph from their positions and elect herself as the Company's new managing member.

She then filed a declaratory judgment suit in Stafford County Circuit Court seeking judicial confirmation that her actions were legitimate. The court rejected her arguments, deciding that Dewey was "dissociated" from the LLC under Virginia law as soon as he died and that he had no authority to transfer the LLC control rights to her. The Virginia Supreme Court agreed with the court below, finding that Ms. Ott lacked authority to remove the LLC's managing member and successor managing member. "It was not within Dewey's power under the Agreement unilaterally to convey to Janet his control interest and make her a member of the Company upon his death because the Agreement could not confer that power on him," the court ruled.

Once a plaintiff has introduced evidence to establish a "badge of fraud," a prima facie case of fraudulent conveyance is established and the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that the transaction was not fraudulent. So held the Virginia Supreme Court, in reversing the Henrico County Circuit Court's decision to strike the plaintiff's evidence and enter judgment in favor of the defendant.

Fox Rest Associates, L.P. v. Anne B. Little involved a dispute between George B. Little, an attorney and the general partner of Fox Rest Apartments, and the limited partners of Fox Rest Apartments, arising out of an alleged sale of the apartments by the general partner without the consent or knowledge of the limited partners. After learning that the limited partners planned to sue him, Mr. Little made various transfers, including transfers into an account at SunTrust Bank held jointly with his wife. The limited partners filed a derivative action against Fox Rest for malpractice, double billing, and other claims. The limited partners obtained a judgment but were unable to collect approximately $856,400. They then proceeded to file a fraudulent conveyance action to attempt to set aside various transfers as fraudulent.

The trial court struck the limited partners' evidence, finding that they had produced insufficient evidence of fraudulent intent. The Supreme Court, however, reversed. Under Virginia law, it pointed out, to survive a motion to strike, a plaintiff need only introduce evidence of "badges of fraud." Badges (or presumptions) of fraud include:

(1) retention of an interest in the transferred property by the transferor; (2) transfer between family members for allegedly antecedent debt; (3) pursuit of the transferor or threat of litigation by his creditors at the time of the transfer; (4) lack of or gross inadequacy of consideration for the conveyance; (5) retention or possession of the property by transferor; and (6) fraudulent incurrence of indebtedness after the conveyance.

Here, the court found, the limited partners had proved the existence of several of these badges of fraud. First, Little maintained an interest in the funds deposited in the SunTrust account since it was a joint account. Second, the transfers were made after the dispute arose over his management of Fox Rest, the dispute that led to the derivative suit. Additionally, the Supreme Court found that it was fair to assume that Little's wife knew of his fraudulent intent since she was aware of the problems between her husband and the limited partners and of the lawsuit. An accountant testified at trial that Mrs. Little received a minimum benefit of $940,000 from the challenged transfers. This, the court said, established a prima facie case of fraudulent conveyance.

Many contracts provide that in the event of litigation arising out of a breach, the prevailing party will be entitled to recover "reasonable" attorneys' fees from the losing party. Some attorneys, however, hoping to obviate the need for a mini-trial regarding the reasonableness of the fees, draft contracts setting the attorneys' fees as a fixed percentage of the underlying obligation (e.g., 15% of the total amount due). But what happens when the underlying obligation is so large that applying the fixed percentage stated in the contract would result in awarding the prevailing party far more than it actually incurred in legal fees?

Judge Leonie M. Brinkema recently faced that question and ruled that the percentage-based attorneys-fee provision was unenforceable as a matter of law. Considering a request for attorneys' fees and costs after the conclusion of a commercial case, she rejected a finance company's contention that a flat 15 percent of the amount it recovered in the case should be awarded to it as attorneys' fees, even though the loan document in question specified that fees not less than 15 percent of the amount in question should be awarded.

Automotive Finance Corp. (AFC), based in Indiana, provided financing for several automobile dealer showrooms in Virginia. Later, it filed suit against the dealers and against three companies that guaranteed the debt. After a trial, Judge Brinkema awarded AFC $3,156,149 in damages. AFC then applied to the court for attorneys' fees in the amount of $473,422.35 (precisely 15 percent of the recovery) which amount exceeded the fees and costs it actually incurred. While finding AFC's argument "appealing in its simplicity," Judge Brinkema said the problem with it is that it "flies in the face of the applicable case law." The fees awarded in any piece of litigation, according to both Virginia and Indiana law, must be reasonable.

Courts in the Eastern District of Virginia examine twelve factors when evaluating the reasonableness of a claim for reimbursement of attorneys fees: (1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorneys' opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorneys' expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases.

Applying these factors, as well as Indiana law as required by the contract, the court found that 15 percent was unsupportable. She wrote, "To allow a party to recover more in an attorneys' fees award than it actually incurred in legal expenses would confer an unreasonable windfall on that party and would be fundamentally at odds with the basic principle that the party requesting fees bears the burden of proving that such fees are reasonable."

Instead, Judge Brinkema ruled, AFC is only entitled to "recoup the fees which it can prove that it actually and reasonably incurred." After making some deductions for duplicative time entries and deferring to the bankruptcy court on the reasonableness of fees incurred in that forum, Judge Brinkema awarded AFC the sum of $217,414.91 in fees and costs, less than half the amount requested.

In Virginia, non-compete agreements will be enforced if they are narrowly drawn to protect the employer's business interests, if they are not unduly restrictive of the employee's ability to earn a living, and if they are not against public policy. While noncompetes are often struck down as disfavored restraints on trade, a recent Fairfax County decision demonstrates that, when properly drafted, a non-compete or non-solicitation agreement can be a valuable tool for any business wanting to protect its competitive position in the marketplace.

Preferred Systems Solutions, Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC, involved a dispute between a government IT contractor, Preferred Systems Solutions ("PSS") and GP Consulting, an IT consulting firm. On October 1, 2003, PSS and GP entered into an agreement in which GP would provide certain consulting services to PSS in connection with a project for the Defense Logistics Agency involving Enterprise Resource Planning software. The agreement included a non-compete provision prohibiting GP from competing with PSS for 12 months after the completion or termination of the agreement.

On February 1, 2010, GP terminated the agreement. Its last day working for PSS was February 12, 2010. Four days later, its sole member and manager, Sreenath Gajulapalli, started working for Accenture, a direct competitor of PSS, performing the same duties that he had performed for PSS. Judge R. Terrence Ney ruled that Mr. Gajulapalli's conduct was in direct violation of the non-compete agreement, which provided (in pertinent part) that:

"During the term of this Agreement and for twelve (12) months thereafter, [GP] hereby covenants and agrees that [it] will not, either directly or indirectly: (a) enter into a contract as a subcontractor with Accenture, LLP and or DLA to provide the same or similar support that PSS is providing to Accenture, LLP and/or DLA and in support of the DLA Business Systems Modernization (BSM) program."

Judge Ney noted that the noncompete was "very narrowly drawn" in that it provided specifically that GP was barred from working as a consultant for only two entities - Accenture, a private company; and directly for DLA, a government agency. Also, it proscribed the competitive conduct for only one year, and was very specific as to what sorts of activities would be prohibited; namely, work done in support of the DLA Business Systems Modernization program.

At trial, Gajulapalli admitted upon cross-examination that after he left PSS for Accenture, he worked for Accenture on the same project, at the same desk, at the same computer, and on the same problems that he used while working at PSS - just three days after leaving PSS. The court was also persuaded by the testimony of a senior vice president of PSS that there were 400-500 SAP programmer jobs in the metro D.C. area when GP entered into its contract with Accenture. Therefore, the non-compete didn't harm Gajulapalli's ability to earn a living as a SAP programmer.

For breach of the non-compete agreement, Judge Ney entered judgment against GP Consulting in the amount of $172,395.96, the damages incurred by PSS during the 12-month non-compete period.

Courts don't often grant requests to "pierce the corporate veil" - in other words, to disregard the existence of a corporation and to hold a shareholder personally liable for the corporation's debts - but in a recent Virginia case, a judge did just that, entering a personal judgment against a corporation's sole shareholder for nearly $140,000. His mistake? Failing to observe corporate formalities, and arranging for the corporation to enter into a contract while grossly undercapitalized.

Advance Technologies, Inc., had been hired as a sub-subcontractor by subcontractor ACE Electric Company on a boiler maintenance project for the University of Richmond. ACE, however, soon terminated Advance from the project, and Advance went out of business. In December 2009, a default judgment was entered against Advance for more than $137,500. ACE was unable to recover any of this money from Advance, so it sued Erik Butler, the sole shareholder, officer, and director of Advance, in an attempt to pierce the corporate veil and recover funds from Butler's personal assets to satisfy the judgment. ACE's lawyers also invoked a "reverse piercing" theory by seeking to impose liability against Butler's wife, DeAnne Butler, and from another corporation, ADVTEC, Inc., of which she was the sole officer, shareholder, and director. ACE claimed that ADVTEC was created by DeAnne Butler in a fraudulent attempt to avoid the debts incurred by Advance.

In an opinion handed down on April 29, 2011, Judge Gary A. Hicks of the Circuit Court of Henrico County wrote that piercing the veil and permitting a plaintiff to recover from the personal assets of a shareholder is "an extraordinary remedy that is infrequently granted." The judge pointed out that there are generally sound legal and economic reasons for granting immunity to shareholders. However, the judge noted, exceptions do exist. In this case, the judge wrote, the evidence was "sufficient to pierce the corporate veil as to Erik Butler." The court found that Butler failed to adhere to corporate formalities (such as conducting annual meetings and maintaining separate books for the corporation), and that when Advance entered into the contract with ACE, Advance was "grossly undercapitalized." It had only between $10,000 and $15,000 in the bank, and owed back taxes both to the IRS and to Virginia authorities. Under these circumstances, Judge Hicks wrote, it would be a "profound injustice" not to permit ACE to go after Erik Butler's personal assets to satisfy the default judgment.

Judge Hicks rejected, however, the attempt to reverse-pierce by holding the newly formed ADVTEC liable for the judgment against Advance. He wrote that although trial evidence "creates a suspicion that ADVTEC is nothing more than the alter ego of Advance," ACE did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that this is the case. Both Erik and DeAnne Butler testified that DeAnne, not Erik, was the ultimate decision maker at ADVTEC and that there were legitimate business reasons for the creation of that company. Accordingly, the judge declined to pierce that particular corporate veil.