Virginia Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

Lawyers who represent clients in litigation often assume that they can simply withdraw from the case if the client stops paying the lawyer's bills. Engagement letters and representation agreements often provide that an attorney will withdraw in the event of nonpayment. A federal court sitting in Richmond, Virginia, however, denied a law firm's withdrawal request in such a situation, demonstrating that lawyers representing corporations in Virginia's federal courts cannot assume they will be released from their litigation duties when their clients are being uncooperative--even if their clients are not paying the lawyer's bills.

In Reynolds v. Reliable Transmissions, Inc., the law firm of ThompsonMcMullan, P.C., filed a motion to withdraw from its representation of the defendant. The grounds of the motion were typical: the client failed to make the required fee deposit, failed to pay the law firm's bill, and failed to respond to the lawyers' efforts to communicate about the case. The law firm filed its motion early in the case: no discovery had taken place, and no trial date had been set. The posture of the case was such that most lawyers would consider a court's granting of the motion to be fairly automatic. After all, the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct expressly permit withdrawal where "the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services," provided that court approval is obtained. The plaintiff did not even oppose the motion.

Judge Dohnal explained, however, that nonpayment of fees is usually not a sufficient basis, standing alone, to permit an attorney to withdraw from pending litigation in the absence of another attorney ready to take over the case. In Virginia state and federal courts, corporations must appear by counsel; they cannot represent themselves. For this reason, and because no other attorney had been identified to assume the representation, the court denied the motion to withdraw.

The result might be different, the court noted, if there were individual defendants remaining in the case whose interests were aligned with the corporation. The law firm in such a situation would likely be permitted to withdraw because individuals may appear pro se (i.e., represent themselves) and would likely address (at least indirectly) the interests of the similarly-situated corporation.

To file a lawsuit in Virginia's state or federal courts against a non-resident of Virginia or an out-of-state corporation, it is necessary to establish "personal jurisdiction" over the defendant. A court has no power over parties to a lawsuit absent such jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction will exist only if (1) Virginia's "long-arm" statute authorizes it; and (2) the defendant has certain "minimum contacts" with Virginia "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," which is required by constitutional due process. In a recent case from the Eastern District of Virginia, Judge Trenga held that a passive website not purposefully targeted at Virginians was not sufficient to create a basis for personal jurisdiction and he dismissed the case.

The case, which contains counts for actual fraud, constructive fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, was filed by Dr. Olimpia Rosario, a Virginia psychiatrist, against professional psychic Jeffrey Wands, who operates Psychic Eye Media in New York. Dr. Rosario became impressed with Mr. Wands several years ago when he correctly predicted that she would obtain a residency in a New York-based hospital. Ever since, Dr. Rosario has sought counseling and guidance from Mr. Wands on a wide range of issues, including spiritual issues and substance abuse problems, despite the fact he held no degree or license to practice any type of healing art, medicine, counseling, or social work in either Virginia or New York.

Eventually, Mr. Wands became concerned about certain of Dr. Rosario's behavior and reported it to both the New York Police Department and the Virginia Board of Medicine. Dr. Rosario sued, claiming Mr. Wands caused her condition to worsen and denying abuse of prescription drugs. Mr. Wands, a resident of New York, moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Dr. Rosario's main argument in support of jurisdiction was that Mr. Wands maintained a website accessible to residents of Virginia (as well as everyone else in the world having an Internet connection) and touting a national following. The court disagreed that such a website was sufficient to establish a "presence" in Virginia sufficient to form a basis for personal jurisdiction. Citing a Fourth Circuit case, the court noted that "a person who simply places information on the Internet does not subject himself to jurisdiction in each State into which the electronic signal is transmitted." There were no allegations that Mr. Wands' website was interactive or that users could conduct transactions through the website. The court also noted the absence of any facts demonstrating that Mr. Wands was intentionally targeting citizens of Virginia. For these reasons, the court found general jurisdiction lacking.

Specific jurisdiction was also found to be absent. This more limited type of jurisdiction, the court noted, exists when a defendant "purposefully directed his activities at the residents of the forum" and the plaintiff's causes of action "arise out of those activities" (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). In Virginia, courts must consider the following in determining whether specific jurisdiction should be asserted: "(1) the extent to which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the plaintiffs' claims arise out of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable" (citing Consulting Eng'rs Corp. v. Geometric, Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 278 (4th Cir. 2009)). Dr. Rosario argued that Mr. Wands purposefully directed his activities at Virginia when, for seven years, he and Dr. Rosario participated in quarterly telephone discussions. The court found such minimal contact insufficient, especially since Mr. Wands never physically came to Virginia for any of those discussions.

Getting fired or laid off is hard enough without your boss trashing your reputation to your co-workers. I receive many calls from prospective clients interested in pursuing their former employer for defamation. Virginia employers, however, have a lot of leeway in what they can say about an employee being considered for termination before they will be liable for slander or libel. Virginia recognizes a qualified privilege against defamation claims where statements by an employer are made in connection with discharging that employee. To overcome that privilege, a plaintiff must prove common law malice by clear and convincing evidence.

Consider the recent Hanover County case of Koegler v. Green, decided on September 1, 2009. Carl Koegler sued his former employer, the Richmond-East Moose Lodge, as well as several of his former co-workers and employers, for defamation. The defendants demurred (i.e., moved to dismiss the case), citing the qualified privilege, and the court agreed with them and dismissed the case. The court emphasized that defamation claims against employers in Virginia will not be permitted to go forward absent strong evidence of malice.

The facts, according to the allegations in the complaint, were as follows: Mr. Koegler was employed by the Lodge in various positions over the years. An audit conducted by the international parent company resulted in Mr. Koegler's termination in 2008. Some of his former coworkers and managers talked to other employees about the firing. The acting Governor of the Lodge, for example, held a staff meeting and discussed what had been said in board meetings about Mr. Koegler and that Mr. Koegler had been suspended for stealing money. Another officer of the Lodge sent emails describing Mr Koegler as having "questionable character." Mr. Koegler sued for defamation and harm to his reputation.

The court held that, to state a claim for defamation, the plaintiff would have to allege sufficient facts to enable a reasonable jury to find clear and convincing evidence of "common law malice," defined as "some sinister or corrupt motive such as hatred, revenge, personal spite, ill will, or desire to injure the plaintiff; or what, as a matter of law is equivalent to malice, that the communication was made with such gross indifference and recklessness as to amount to a wanton or willful disregard of the rights of the plaintiff." In the end, the court concluded that Mr. Kroegler had not presented a case sufficient to enable a reasonably jury to find clear and convincing evidence of malice, and dismissed the case.

Worried about liability for statements made by others in an online forum hosted by your website? Provided you don't take an active role in editing the content posted by others, you shouldn't have to worry about defamation liability. The Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), found at 47 U.S.C. § 230, provides that "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." It further provides that "No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section."

In the still-pending case of Cornelius v. DeLuca, filed in the Eastern District of Missouri, the plaintiffs, sellers of a dietary supplement called "Syntrax," sued various competitors for libel and tortious interference with business expectancies, and also sued the owners of bodybuilding.com--a website containing a forum for Internet discussion by the public--for supposedly assisting the other defendants post false and defamatory statements to the forum. In essence, the plaintiffs tried to get around the CDA by claiming the host of the forum wasn't a mere "provider" but an active participant in a conspiracy to post libelous, defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff's product. The court rejected the argument and dismissed the conspiracy count.

Under the CDA, while content providers cannot be held liable for the statements of others, they can be held liable for their own statements (which is why providers need to be careful not to edit others' statements, thereby arguably adopting the statement as their own). It is undoubtedly for this reason that the plaintiffs, realizing full well that the owners of bodybuilding.com did not make the statements at issue themselves, alleged that the owners conspired with the actual authors to allow the statements to be posted.

What the plaintiffs failed to do is present actual facts demonstrating the existence of a conspiracy. (To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege more than a mere formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action; he must allege facts that, if proven, would support the existence of the claimed cause of action.) The complaint at issue alleged no facts regarding the website owners' conduct other than the fact that they operated the message board, thereby "allowing" the allegedly defamatory statements to be published. No details were alleged concerning the details of the supposed conspiracy. The court held that, in light of the CDA, this was not enough.